When the Cheering (for Gideon)
Stops: The Defense Bar and
Representation at Initial Bail Hearings

By Douglas L. Colbert

early 50 years after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 the criminal defense bar applauds
the greater access to justice that indigent defendants enjoy today. Poor people accused of a crime can count
on a lawyer’s representation at trial and at critical pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding. Americans now
think of legal representation as a birthright, helping to preserve “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” among
their inalienable rights. But Gideon’s promise of counsel to “any person haled into court,”2 still holds unfulfilled
guarantees of equal justice and an even playing field for an accused when first appearing at a judicial proceeding.
Throughout most of the country, assigned defenders are not present at the first bail hearing, leaving the accused
indigent defendant without an attorney when liberty is at stake and a lawyer’s advocacy could make the biggest difference in determining whether a judicial officer continues incarceration. Absent counsel, an accused is likely to receive
an excessive or unreasonable bail. Those who cannot afford bail, including many charged with nonviolent crimes, will
remain in jail between two and 70 days, waiting for their assigned lawyer’s advocacy before a judicial officer. Taxpayers
are left to pay the high cost of incarceration before trial.
This article suggests that the absence of representation at the beginning of a State criminal prosecution must
come to a screeching halt. The criminal defense bar should take a leadership role and dedicate Gideon’s anniversary to
making certain that an accused’s right to the effective assistance of counsel begins at the initial bail hearing. Indeed,
guaranteeing vigorous representation should be the defense bar’s number one priority.

Gideon’s Gap: Assuring Representation at First Appearance

Within the legal culture and social justice arena, few decisions illustrate more clearly the commitment to equal
justice for a poor person accused of a crime than Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 1963
ruling. Before Gideon, it was commonplace for many local prosecutors to bring felony charges and to convict unrepresented criminal defendants in state court.3 In these jurisdictions, prosecutors knew that a defense lawyer would not
be present and that an indigent defendant would represent himself or herself at trial. One can imagine the ease with
which State prosecutors and judges could proceed without facing a defense lawyer’s objections or challenges to their
unbridled power.
Gideon’s sweeping Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel and due process right to liberty holdings
transformed States’ usual practice of prosecuting felony crimes without guaranteeing representation and replaced it
with the newly created public defender or assigned defense counsel system. Within the next decade, the high Court
extended the constitutional mandate of counsel to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors,4 who comprise
more than 90 percent of people entering local criminal court systems. By 1974, State criminal defendants could be
assured of a public defender or an assigned counsel appearing at the relatively rare trial and at “critical”5 pretrial stages
that the Supreme Court considered essential. The unanimous Gideon Court envisioned these evolutionary changes
when it declared: “The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
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fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.”6
The constitutional guarantee of counsel, however, has
had little meaning for indigent
defendants prosecuted in States
and localities that have rejected
the right to a lawyer’s immediate representation at the initial
judicial proceeding. Indeed,
States relied upon the Supreme
Court’s 1974 rejection of counsel at the probable cause stage
to justify nonrepresentation at
the initial bail hearing when
pretrial release is decided.7 The
Court’s ruling in Gerstein v.
Pugh helped to muddy the constitutional waters of an
accused’s entitlement to counsel even further. Until the
Supreme
Court
decided
Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
Texas,8 nearly 35 years later,
confusion
reigned
over
whether the right to counsel
even attached at the initial
appearance.9
Newly arrested defendants
are likely to appear alone when
initially facing a judicial officer
in today’s criminal court.10 Indeed, only 10 states guarantee
counsel at the initial bail hearing;11 the remaining states either fail to provide an assigned
counsel at all12 or do so on a
county-by-county basis.13 Nonrepresentation becomes even
more alarming when one realizes the substantial difference a
lawyer’s advocacy often makes.
When counsel stands with the
typical defendant charged with
a nonviolent crime and offers
an effective argument, the
chance of a judicial officer ordering pretrial release or an affordable bail increases significantly.14
A lawyer’s informed and
compelling advocacy often
makes the difference, particularly when the charge against
the accused involves no violence or injury to another. Bail
amounts will vary from judge
to judge, but without the information and argument provided
by the defense lawyer, judicial
officers are likely to make many
incorrect decisions and exercise
discretion that appears harsh
and punitive. Unrepresented
low-income defendants remain
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The Maryland
Experience
Without a lawyer’s presence and zealous advocacy at
the initial bail hearing, unreasonabale, and frequently inexplicable, bail amounts result. This is a problem all over the United
States. To document the excessive and unlawful bail practices that
have become common in local courts, students at the University of
Maryland Frances King Carey School of Law recently observed what happened
to unrepresented defendants when they first appeared before a judicial officer in
Baltimore County, Md., during randomly selected days in March 2012.15 As happens
elsewhere in Maryland, the county’s indigent defendants had not been represented by a
public defender when a court commissioner (similar to a magistrate) made the initial release
or bail determination. The county was one of the 21 Maryland jurisdictions (out of 24) that
also did not provide counsel when a reviewing judge subsequently examined the commissioner’s rulings (one to four days later). Until recently, incarcerated defendants in these 21
counties remained without the benefit of counsel’s in-court advocacy during the first 30 days
after prosecution commenced.16 Consider examples of the extraordinary decisions that commissioners and reviewing judges rendered in Baltimore County — without a defense lawyer
present — for people charged with nonviolent crimes.

Shannon Nanth,17 a 35-year-old destitute mother, appeared before a commissioner on a criminal truancy charge based upon her daughter’s excessive
absences from school. If convicted, she faced a maximum 10-day punishment.
Aware that Nanth missed her prior order to show cause hearing and had two
prior misdemeanor convictions and two pending misdemeanor charges, the
commissioner ordered $25,000 bail and postponed the case for 30 days. The
reviewing judge then revised the bond to $2,501. Why $2,501? Maryland law
allows a defendant to post a 10 percent refundable deposit for bonds of $2,500
or less; a judge’s $2,501 bail requires the financially strapped defendant to pay a
bail bondsman’s nonrefundable 10 percent fee.

Paul Ballard, a financial manager, allegedly had been feuding with his neighbor, a police officer, who charged that Ballard damaged his car by “mule-kicking”
it. Arrested for the misdemeanor crime of malicious destruction of property, the
commissioner set bail at $250,000. The reviewing judge indicated he was prepared to reduce the bail until Ballard complained about his neighbor. The judge
explained his concern for the police officer’s safety and maintained the $250,000
bail amount. To regain freedom, Ballard paid the bondman’s $25,000 fee.
Eighteen-year-old Jalon Long appeared before a commissioner on drug possession and intent to sell charges related to possession of marijuana and four “small
bags” of cocaine. The commissioner ordered $250,000 bail. The reviewing judge
reduced the amount to $100,000. The accused had no prior convictions or failures
to appear in criminal court.
A $25,000 bail bond for a mother charged with her child’s truancy. A $250,000 bond
for allegedly damaging a neighbor’s car; a similar $250,000 bond for a defendant engaged
in a potential low-level drug transaction. Do these exceedingly high bail amounts sound
familiar? Lawyers may be more accustomed to the “reasonable” bail amount that often is
still considerably beyond the low-income defendant’s limited resources. For instance,
would a destitute parent find the reduced $2,501 bond reasonable? Would most 18-yearolds be able to take advantage of a bail “lowered” to $100,000? The prepared lawyer might
have gained their release on recognizance or persuaded a judicial officer to order a “reasonably calculated”18 amount that considered the individual’s financial circumstances. The
represented defendant would likely have been spared paying the bail bondsman’s nonrefundable 10 percent fee.
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the most vulnerable to suffer the consequences of an erroneous bail decision because
they lack the money to post a higher amount. When charged with nonviolent crimes,
the arrest process becomes the punishment, and the taxpayer picks up the costly
expense of unnecessary jailing. Counsel’s advocacy and counsel’s devotion to a client’s
liberty are necessary change agents for pretrial justice reform.
It is time for public outcry by the criminal defense bar. Since 2008, when the
Supreme Court in Rothgery cited NACDL’s valuable research,19 the organization has
taken a visible role as amicus in asserting indigents’ right to counsel at the initial
appearance in crucial state court rulings.20 Now it must go one step further and
champion the constitutional right to counsel for indigent defendants when they first
enter each state’s judicial arena. NACDL members of the private bar need to take a
public stand that explains a lawyer’s essential role at the beginning of a criminal
prosecution. Public defenders also are crucial in asserting the need for counsel; they
must give the highest priority to defending clients’ liberty and fair trial rights at the
initial bail hearing. As the leading criminal defense organization, NACDL is in position to sound Gideon’s trumpet of equal justice and summon support from judges,
prosecutors, corrections, and other criminal justice partners, as well as the communities the defenders serve. Together, the stakeholders can make clear that nonrepresentation of indigent defendants threatens the legitimacy, integrity, and efficiency of
the justice system.

Gaining a client’s release at the bail stage often results
in a better case outcome. It also avoids an accused being
dismissed from work, evicted from home, and unable to
care for dependent children and elders while incarcerated.

Ensuring legal representation at the initial bail hearing will require a significant
cultural shift in the administration of pretrial justice. For decades, the principal players have accepted the status quo and conducted initial bail proceedings without an
assigned defender present to protect the rights of an accused and the interest of the
public. While it may seem odd for the impartial judge and “minister of justice”21
prosecutor to administer fairness without guaranteeing a lawyer for the accused, it is
even more perplexing that the criminal defense bar has not registered a louder
protest. Defense attorneys know that a lawyer is a “necessity and not a luxury”22 for
protecting poor people’s freedom rights. Gideon’s basic maxim, delivered nearly a
half-century ago, must now translate to defenders and to the private defense bar
demanding legal representation for the poor.

Changing Culture: Assigned Lawyers
Fighting the Good Fight

Every criminal defense lawyer knows the challenge of defending a person
accused of a crime. It begins with the constant, exasperated refrain from friends,
family, and colleagues: “How can you defend those people?” It continues with the
lonely battles that the conscientious lawyer wages as the decided underdog against
the State’s formidable and well-resourced law enforcement and crime-fighting
apparatus. The David and Goliath setting proves attractive to many private and
public defenders. They enjoy the challenge of protecting the individual against the
powerful government and of standing as a guardian of freedom for the politically
powerless, while thwarting potential abuse of discretion by prosecutors, police, and
judicial officers.
Public defenders face particular obstacles in seeking equal and fair justice for
their indigent clientele. Elected officials and the media often vent their animus toward
the accused, who are disproportionately poor and of color and who may be tied to an
unpopular group, such as the immigrant population. The private defense bar is aware
of the near-impossible professional demands placed on the typical public defender,
who invariably has too many clients and too few investigators, staff, and resources to
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meet the ethical standards of managing
a caseload that stretches beyond accepted professional boundaries.
Few would quarrel with the
notion that an even playing field for
the accused requires the assigned
counsel or public defender to present
a well-argued, prepared, fact-supported, persuasive, and passionate argument. Caseload responsibilities and
staffing limitations, however, make
that a formidable challenge at the different stages of a criminal proceeding
— particularly at the first appearance
or judicial bail hearing. Logistics, for
example, present different hurdles to
overcome. Defenders require cooperation to locate and conduct a confidential interview of an incarcerated
client before hearings begin. The
attorney must attempt to verify information for the judicial officer’s consideration — a difficult prospect considering a public telephone is not easily available and incarcerated defendants often do not have contact information for friends, relatives, and
employers on hand. Additionally, a
defender faces an uphill battle when
seeking to persuade a judicial officer
to order an indigent client’s release or
a meaningful bail reduction. Many
judicial officers are known for deciding cases swiftly, limiting argument,
being pro-prosecution, and setting
high bails that are far from the “least
onerous” option that the law requires
and impossible for defendants to
meet.23
How then can a defender increase
the likelihood of success? Consider the
following suggestions and law reform
ideas.
Defenders must plan and carry out
advocacy that provides judicial officers
with clear reasons for ordering pretrial
release. Nothing less than the assigned
lawyer’s prepared and earnest effort
will suffice. The reasons must be supported legally and with factual corroboration.
Defenders must be assured of access
to interview clients and to verify essential
information before the initial appearance.
Without access, defenders do not stand
much of a chance of influencing a judicial officer’s ruling. Ideally, the defense
attorney will conduct the interview;
when that is not possible, defenders
should employ paralegals or seek volunteers who can be trained to obtain and
corroborate the necessary information.
When
preparing
arguments,
defenders should reach out to experienced lawyers who have a reputation
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and record of success. Veteran attorneys
still remember the days when they were
taught by the top lawyers in the profession. Now it is time for these veterans
to model persuasive advocacy for colleagues who must face the difficult,
cautious, or skeptical judicial officer at
the outset of a criminal prosecution.
The experienced advocate can teach
younger colleagues ways to educate a
judicial officer about a client’s limited
financial resources, the law’s preference
for release, and the consequences of
pretrial incarceration. Most important,
veterans can teach younger defense
attorneys how to apply the skills of persuasive argument at the initial bail
hearing.
The defense bar can help raise the
competence of colleagues who often say
little on behalf of indigent clients seeking
to regain their liberty. Frequently, the
problem lies with the defender not
always having met or spoken to the
client, and having little familiarity with
the facts that judicial officers might find
persuasive in determining whether to
order pretrial release: a person’s residence, family, employment, schooling,
military service, and particularly, limited finances. That may explain why law
student observers in Baltimore reported
that defenders speak an average of 32
seconds when attempting to protect a
client from losing his or her freedom for
up to a month until next appearing in
court. While not much can usually be
accomplished in a 32-second argument,
that is still far better than the absence of
any argument in jurisdictions in which
defenders decline to appear and leave
the unrepresented accused baffled as to
what to say and what not to say.
Moreover, while some defenders make a
valiant effort to use available information effectively, others refrain from
making passionate, convincing arguments. General requests for “reasonable
bail, Your Honor,” or arguments
couched with “we submit,” are the verbal equivalent of nails on a chalkboard,
especially when a judge would welcome
a stronger argument. Effective assistance of counsel must become a professional imperative.
The defense bar must make a cultural shift and acknowledge that the initial
appearance is a critical, and perhaps the
most important, stage of a criminal proceeding.24 Criminal defense lawyers are
aware of the substantial difference that
occurs when a client regains liberty
before trial. With a client’s early assistance, counsel is likely to conduct a successful investigation and prepare a solid
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defense. An improved attorney-client relationship develops too, and the released
defendant has the opportunity to present himself or herself more favorably when
returning to court. Gaining a client’s release at the bail stage often results in a better
case outcome. It also avoids an accused being dismissed from work, evicted from
home, and unable to care for dependent children and elders while incarcerated.
Representation at the defendant’s first appearance means that defenders are seen
and heard at the outset of a criminal prosecution rather than days, weeks, or months
later. Defenders are no longer seen as “soft”; they approach the first appearance with
a sense of urgency and collaboration. Spirit and morale are enhanced when colleagues bring their best arguments for persuading judicial officers. Sometimes, the
“best” argument centers on the nonviolent charge or the client’s nonviolent past.
Other times it may focus on the client’s consistent record of appearing in court, lack
of prior or recent convictions, or current employment and student status.
Frequently, the defender should point to the minimal resources available to lowincome defendants and urge pretrial supervision, unsecured bonds, or the 10 percent
refundable option to the full bond. Other occasions call for strenuous objections to
exceedingly high and near-impossible financial conditions for a jailed defendant.
Taken together, defenders ought to view liberty at the initial appearance as important as they view freedom at trial.
When judicial officers rule against a defendant who presented a compelling claim
for release, counsel must consider legal challenges. Filing a writ of habeas corpus and
seeking reconsideration from the judge who ordered the bail based on new evidence
demonstrates persistence and a pro-active approach that represents a significant
departure from the usual “do nothing until the next appearance” practice. Indeed,
speaking to the prosecuting attorney about newly discovered information also may
lead to a consensual agreement regarding bail, particularly for the nonviolent offender. Defenders should propose procedures for reviewing detainees’ bail conditions at
regularly scheduled weekly hearings.
In summary, counsel for an accused must deliver the same full effort at the initial appearance that is required whenever a client’s freedom lies in the balance. While
time is limited, the lawyer is still able to present a focused, planned, and targeted
argument for pretrial release, especially when the outcome may (1) deprive an
accused of liberty for lengthy periods until trial, (2) impact dependents who rely on
the detainee’s care and finances, and (3) lead to coerced pleas and harsher punishments. Because the consequences are so serious, defenders should receive additional
training and supervision. The first appearance — the freedom hearing — ought to
be given the highest attention.

Conclusion

The culture of passive acceptance of pretrial incarceration of unrepresented
detainees must change. Defenders can no longer remain on the sidelines when an
indigent client’s liberty is being decided at the initial appearance before a judicial
officer. Assigned defenders for the accused must embrace their role as advocates
for protecting individual freedom that will reduce the excessive cost of pretrial
incarceration at taxpayers’ expense. In States’ criminal justice systems to which
few criminal cases are tried and virtually every local criminal defendant appears
at a first appearance judicial hearing, the attitude and approach of defenders
should undergo a dramatic shift. After a criminal prosecution commences,
defenders must be present and apply the same competitive and adversarial
approach that they apply as advocates at trial. Attorneys for accused indigents
must be seen and heard vigorously protecting clients’ liberty and fair trial rights
at the initial judicial proceeding. While the focus of representation almost invariably is upon procuring a dismissal or not guilty verdict, defenders should highlight the importance of pretrial liberty to their clients and to their cases.
Defenders must fully appreciate the consequences of a client remaining incarcerated before trial — “even for a brief time.”25
NACDL and the criminal defense bar will assume a pivotal role in determining
whether Gideon’s promise of equal justice to the indigent and low-income defendant
becomes a reality. NACDL’s creation of a Pretrial Justice Task Force will assist the
organization in persuading public defenders to work with experienced counsel,
deploy available staff to the initial bail hearing, and devote more attention to first
appearance preparation and supervision. The task force will attempt to identify
models that will allow public defenders to enhance representation, and show that the
savings from pretrial supervision will offset the additional cost for public defenders’
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advocacy at the initial bail hearing. Clients and taxpayers deserve as much.
NACDL’s diverse membership of private and public defenders has an excellent
opportunity to join forces and explain why the criminal justice community sees first
appearance representation as necessary toward fulfilling Gideon’s promise of equal
justice. The organization’s renewed commitment and outburst of energy should take
advantage of the support expressed by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and the
Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, the Pretrial Justice Institute,
and the growing pretrial community that favors changing a legal culture. Recent
Supreme Court and State high court rulings in New York and Maryland, for instance,
point to increased judicial understanding of counsel’s importance for detainees
awaiting trial.26 Building a criminal justice coalition that includes the judiciary, prosecutors, corrections, academics, researchers and data collectors, and analysts will add
to a high court’s appreciation when it considers the constitutional right to counsel at
the initial appearance. Gideon’s 50th anniversary is the ideal time for the criminal
defense community to renew its vow and commitment to pretrial freedom and justice for poor people accused of crime.
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